Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron? by Boym, Svetlana
Russian Culture Center for Democratic Culture
2012
Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron?
Svetlana Boym
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, European History Commons,
Other Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Slavic Languages and Societies Commons, and
the Social History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Democratic Culture at Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Russian Culture by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Boym, S. (2012). Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron?. 1-30.
Available at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/russian_culture/8
Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron? 
Svetlana Boym 
Mikhail Mishin, a Soviet satirist, wrote that Russians recognize themselves 
in the famous fairy-tale character Ivan the Fool. He bides his time napping 
on the heated furnace and gets up only to undertake major heroic feats. 
Ivan the Fool might be a great hero, but he has no idea how to survive his 
everyday life. Everyday life, captured in the Russian word byt, is a more 
dangerous enemy to him than the multi-headed fire-spitting dragon. The 
everyday is Russia 's cultural monster. The nation might worship its 
heroes and their fabled ability to withstand hell or high water, but it also 
celebrates their impracticality and helplessness in the face of everyday 
life. 
The distinguished linguist and literary critic Roman Jacobson claims that 
the Russian word for the everyday, byt, is culturally untranslatable into 
other languages: in his view, only Russia among all the European nations 
was capable of fighting "the fortresses of byt" and of conceptualizing 
radical alterity to the everyday (byt). [1] The opposite of byt, the spiritual, 
poetic or revolutionary being (bytie), is at the heart of Russian culture. In 
a similar way, Vladimir Nabokov claims the Russian conception of 
"banality," poshlost -- a word that refers at once to artistic triviality, lack 
of spirituality, and obscenity -- to be absolutely original. In Nabokov's 
view, only Russians were able to devise neatly the concept of poshlost' -- 
because of the "good taste of old Russia." [2] (This is perhaps one of the 
least ironic sentences in Nabokov, bordering on the banal). No wonder, 
another word that was claimed to be untranslatable is podvig -- heroic 
feat, dynamic force. It does not necessarily refer to a specific courageous 
accomplishment; rather, it embodies the notion of unlimited dynamism, 
perpetual movement (dvizhenie) itself. [3] Two Russian "untranslatable" 
words, then, one referring to the everyday and the other to the heroic 
feat, are closely linked and reflect what Russian and Soviet Russian critics 
perceive to be a fundamental feature of Russian mentality. For many 
Russian and Soviet cultural critics, the expression "everyday culture" 
would appear problematic, if not oximoronic, because culture in the 
Russian context, in the singular and with a capital "C," has been defined 
as a heroic battle against the everyday [4] . 
Thus, there are radical differences between the "American dream," the 
dream of the private pursuit of happiness in the family home, and the 
Russian dream that -- at least in the conception of Dostoyevsky and his 
great admirer, the philosopher of the "Russian idea," Nikolai Berdiaev -- 
consisted of spiritual homelessness and messianic nomadism. In Russia , 
the preoccupation with the everyday was frequently conceived as petit-
bourgeois (marked by the derogatory term "meshchanstvo"), inauthentic, 
unspiritual or counter-revolutionary: it was fought against by Westernizers 
and Slavophiles, romantics and modernists, aesthetic and political 
utopianists, Bolsheviks and monarchists alike. To some extent, the 
modern concept of a secular everyday culture has never sunk roots in 
Russia . 
If the American dream is pursued in the individual family house, the 
Soviet dream can only be fulfilled in the communal house. Our central 
archeological site of Soviet civilization is the communal apartment. It is at 
once a memory of Soviet collective home, the institution of social control, 
and the breeding ground of the grass root informants in Stalin's times. We 
will eavesdrop behind the flimsy communal partitions and on the "private" 
collections of "domestic trash" and kitschy souvenirs. Those everyday 
rituals, practices of deviation and secrecy reveal how the official 
ideological designs were inhabited. As such, they seem to precede and 
survive both the Soviet ideology and the communal apartment itself. I will 
combine the perspective of a cultural critic with my own memories of a 
former communal apartment resident who never fulfilled her "communal 
duties" and was frequently chided by watchful neighbors. 
Any discussion of everyday culture is inevitably anachronistic; it raises 
issues of continuity and change in the national self-definition and daily 
practices in Russia , from prerevolutionary to post-Soviet times, from the 
time when there was no single word for "privacy" to the post-Soviet era, 
when privacy became a buzz word. If byt exemplifies the collective 
Russian mentalities, which have survived long durations of time, wars, 
uprisings, and revolutions, so does the opposition to byt, the anti-
byt discourse that is also a part of Russian collective mentality. The 
opposition between byt and bytie can be traced back to Russian Orthodox 
dualism between the sinful existence of this world and the blessed 
transcendence beyond it. Later, it will be redefined and perpetuated by 
symbolist poets (Block, Bely, Soloviev) and the avant-guarde 
revolutionary theorists (Tretiakov, Bogdanov); by Soviet semioticians 
(Boris Uspensky and Yuri Lotman) and the philosophers of the "Russian 
idea" (Berdiaev). Boris Uspensky and Iurii Lotman insist that the binary 
opposition between byt and bytie is a fundamental feature of Russian 
culture; they point out the crucial difference between the Western 
medieval "world beyond the grave," divided into three spaces -- heaven, 
purgatory and hell, and the Russian medieval system, based on a 
fundamental duality. In Russia , the everyday could not therefore be 
perceived as a neutral sphere of the human behavior where the concepts 
of "civil society" and private life originate. [5] But is Russian history (like 
anatomy) destiny? Do the critics of culture describe the historical situation 
of the past, perpetuate cultural mythology, or both? In other words, is 
there, in fact, no neutral sphere of behavior in early modern Russia, or 
has it simply been insufficiently described by Russian cultural historians, 
and hence not integrated into the Russian cultural identity as constructed 
in literary and political writings? [6] 
The Soviet construction of "new byt" did not escape the old dichotomy 
of byt and bytie. In this respect, there is a clear ideological continuity 
between the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia and early Soviet 
leftist theorists. [7] The Soviet iconography of the new byt was thought 
through to the last detail -- or, as Mayakovsky put it, to the last button on 
one's suit." The new byt, one of the early Russian revolutionary dreams, 
was based on the complete restructuring of both time and space; from 
Gastev's utopian schedules of everyday life to the total design of the new 
communist space, from the all-people's house-commune to the making of 
new men and women. But can everyday life be contained by a utopian 
topography? Perhaps it is not surprising that hardly anywhere else in the 
modern Western world in the twentieth century did such a precise 
construction of ideologically correct everyday life exist; nowhere else 
there were so many deviations from this utopian construct. [8] 
New Byt and Stalinist Domestic Bliss 
Let us begin the discussion of iconography of Soviet everyday life with a 
picture of a Stalinist domestic idyll. It is represented by Laktionov's 
programmatic painting "Moving to The New Apartment." The room is 
cheerfully lit, although the source of light is hidden from us. It is the 
natural light of the Socialist Realist bright future. In the center is a 
middle-aged woman with a war medal, proud mistress of the new 
apartment, who seems ready to break into a Russian folk-dance. Nearby is 
her son, an exemplary boy and young pioneer. A portrait of Stalin takes 
the place of a father. The gazes of this Soviet family do not meet; the 
mother looks into the audience as if inviting our approval, the son looks 
up to his proud mother, and Stalin looks in the opposite direction, as if 
watching us through the half-open door, guarding the limits of the visible. 
The scene appears to belong to some familiar totalitarian sitcom: the 
characters wear appropriate Soviet uniforms and freeze in the established 
theatrical poses known from films and paintings, as if waiting the 
predictable prerecorded applause. A few neighbors with whom the family 
will share the communal apartment gather at the door, jolly smiles frozen 
on their faces. The furniture in the room is very sparse and the private 
objects are limited to books, a radio set, toys, a political poster, a globe 
with the largest country of the world usually colored in bright pink, a 
balalaika, an a sickly-looking rubber tree plant (Fikus) in the foreground. 
The painting is neither reflective nor self-reflective; people and objects 
hardly cast any shadows, and there is no mirror hidden in the corner. The 
scene flaunts its perfect transparency of meaning. Michel Foucault's The 
Order of Things ( Les mots et les choses), with an icon of early modern 
civilization, Velazquez' Las Meninas, which tests the rules and limits of 
representation, exposes visual trompe l'œil, and at the same time pays 
homage to the patrons of art -- in this case the royal couple. "Moving to 
the New Apartment," though similarly an icon of Soviet civilization that 
prescribes the order of everyday things, carefully hides all visual and 
ideological manipulations. This is the way a culture wishes to see itself and 
be seen, without thinking about the act of seeing. There are no uneven 
brush strokes and no blind spots; rather, everything is made readable in a 
didactic way, to the point that nobody has to bother reading it. The books 
near the rubber tree plant are all works by established Russian and Soviet 
classics -- of which the revolutionary poet Vladimir Mayakovsky stands 
out, and on the poster we can read the slogan "Glory to our beloved 
Motherland!" The painter cannot afford being suggestive or allow anything 
contingent and accidental to appear on the canvas. [9] This is a perfect 
Socialist Realist genre scene reminiscent of the old Academic paintings. 
What is important is that this is not an image of cozy petit 
bourgeoisdomestic bliss, not a picture of that settled and established 
private life by definition suspect by the Soviet order. [10] Moreover, this is 
not merely a private family festivity, but a celebration of the Soviet 
collective in miniature, in the newly repaired communal apartment. There 
is no distinction between public and private here, only one fluid and 
seemingly cheerful ideological space. 
It is difficult to imagine what could have been judged "ideologically 
incorrect" in this painting that is so carefully and moderately ideological. 
Yet its seamless surface was censored twice from two different sides: first, 
for the rubber tree plant, and later, for the portrait of Stalin. One could 
draw a mental diagonal to connect those two images that were 
iconographically incorrect. When the painting was first exhibited in the 
early nineteen fifties, it was the rubber tree plant in the foreground that 
"rubbed" critics the wrong way. The painting was accused of celebrating 
the petit bourgeois values embodied in the rubber tree plant and of 
"varnishing Soviet reality." The rubber tree plant was regarded as a 
symptom of counter-revolutionary andpetit bourgeois tastes, a personal 
item that should not be a part of collective iconography. But what is so 
wrong with rubber tree plants? 
When I have explained the painting "Moving to the New apartment" to my 
American students, they have attempted to figure out what, specific to 
this plant, made it into a symbol of bad taste. But no knowledge of 
horticulture was helpful in this case. The "rub" is not inherent in the 
rubber plant as such; rather, it depends fully on the context. It turns out 
that the rubber tree plant is a part of American mythology of the nineteen 
fifties as well, but its meaning is completely different. Here is a passage 
from a song featuring a rubber tree plant very popular in the fifties, 
entitled "High Hopes": "Just what makes that poor little ant/Think he can 
move that rubber tree plant/. He's got hi-i-i-gh hopes, he's got hi-i-i-gh 
hopes. . . ." Here the plant is a symbol of natural obstacles to be 
overcome by confidence and hard work, a milestone on the way to the 
American dream. 
The portrait of Stalin is located on a straight diagonal from the rubber tree 
plant; it almost appears that the "great leader of all people" is turning his 
eyes away from this bourgeois "flower of evil." In albums of Soviet art 
during the 60s after the half-hearted official campaign of de-stalinization, 
the painting appeared without the portrait of Stalin that was deemed in 
bad taste. It was seen as a kind of historical embarrassment, implicating 
the painter and his audience in the Stalinist compromise. By covering up 
the compromise of mass collaboration with Stalin, the critics of the 60s 
engaged in another compromise, one of forgetting. The erasure of the 
portrait continued a long tradition of erasing and remaking of history that 
originated in the 20s and continued through the late 80s. It consists of 
omitting historical embarrassments and -- to use the term of a Stalinist 
art critic -- of "varnishing" the reality of authoritarian representation. 
Since this is a didactic painting, we are supposed to learn a lesson from it, 
and the lesson is that the everyday is as natural as the rubber tree plant, 
that history and ideology are as hidden as the portrait of Stalin, and that 
the relationship between everyday and ideology is as "seamless" as the 
painting. 
As we begin to uncover the ideological roots of the rubber plant, the 
cultural plot thickens. It reflects many paradoxes in the Soviet 
construction of the "new everyday" (novyi byt). The iconography of the 
rubber plant is ambiguous. It might have been regarded as the last sickly 
survivor of the exotic palm trees of the imaginary "greenhouses" of the 
upper bourgeoisie, or a poor relative of the infamous geranium on the 
windows of the merchant dwellings that were purged and physically 
eradicated in the campaign against "domestic trash" in the Stalin's time. 
The rubber plant, an iconographic blemish on the image of Socialist Realist 
domestic bliss, and perhaps the only true-to-life object in the painting, 
can function as a trigger of cultural memory and a key to the "archeology" 
of Soviet private and communal life. This cultural archeology is not 
without contradictions. [11] 
The communal apartment depicted in the painting is a far cry from the 
house-commune imagined by the revolutionary architects in the early 
Soviet era. In the post-revolutionary period, architecture turned into a 
major art -- an arch-art, a material embodiment of the revolutionary 
superstructure, a foundation of the social order. It was a rational art of 
conquering and reconstructing the mysterious, the unresolved, and the 
chaotic. Since Marx and Engels did not develop a specific picture of 
communist life, post-revolutionary visionaries turned to utopian writers 
like Moore, Campanella, Owen, Fourier, and tried to adopt for practical use 
their exemplary Ikarias and Cities of Sun. The modern utopias, called sots 
gorod (socialist cities), were expected to spread around the whole world 
through the "socialist resettlement of mankind." The house-commune was 
envisioned as a microcosm of the sots gorod. The sots gorod, in turn, 
served as a microcosm of Soviet society as a whole. The elaborate 
projects for house-communes were developed by Melnikov, Ginsburg, 
Vengerov, and others. The nucleus of the new utopia, the "house-
commune," reflected an ideal of "socialism in one building," to use the 
expression coined by Richard Stite [12]. The house-commune, also known 
as the "new proletariat house," radically reconstructed the individualist 
bourgeois quarters; it de-familiarized them by replacing the familiar 
bourgeois family structure with "proletarian comradeship." In the house-
commune, children were to be cared for collectively to alleviate the 
burden that once fell upon the bourgeois family's individual members. A 
popular slogan was making headway at the time, "Down with the 
dictatorship of the kitchen!" The individual kitchen was denounced as a 
symbol of the nuclear family and women's enslavement by byt. By 
contrast, communal home was not just a retreat for the individual, a place 
marked by personal traces and memories; rather, it was a public and 
therefore ideologically charged site. The communal dwelling's simple and 
stark geometry had to be enjoyed for its own sake. Characteristically, 
contemporary Soviet theorists praised empty spaces shot through with 
light, uncluttered by objects and personal artifacts that could spoil the 
dwelling's pristine purity. Where domestic objects appeared, they were to 
be strictly non-representational and anti-realistic, hinting at alternative 
spatial dimensions that transcend industrial domesticity. El Lissitsky 
compared the room of the future "to the best kind of traveling suitcase." 
He wrote that, for a modern person, it was enough to have an empty 
room, a mattress, a folding chair, a table and a gramophone. [13] (The 
gramophone was his concession to popular taste). 
The campaign for the new byt began with the debunking the old byt. Both 
new and old byt acquired their specific features in the 20s, when the 
revolutionary intelligentsia joined in the bolshevik attack on byt. In his 
suicide note, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Soviet society's foremost revolutionary 
poet, wrote: "The love boat has crashed against byt." This was not only 
the fate of his personal "love boat." In the poet's eyes, the revolution 
itself was held hostage to everyday life. Mayakovsky feared that 
communism would be murdered by yellow canaries and the revolution 
would be betrayed by Marx -- in the crimson frames of a 
cozy meshchanski interior. Mayakovsky fought against all signs of post-
revolutionary domesticity, such as rubber plants, lyrical gramophone 
songs, and all kinds of pets, dead or alive -- kittens, canaries, and the 
infamous elephant figurines. Porcelain elephants, symbolizing private 
happiness, would become notable enemies of the Soviet regime from the 
20s to the 90s. No other animal, except perhaps for a few birds of bad 
taste -- like pink flamingos or yellow canaries -- was to receive such a 
shabby treatment from the revolutionary artists. 
In 1928-29, responding to the poet's call, the Newspaper Komsomolskaia 
Pravda started a campaign "Down with Domestic Trash." "Let us stop the 
production of tasteless bric-à-brac!," urged the newspaper. "All these 
dogs, mermaids, figurine devils and elephants only help smuggle 
backmeshchanstvo. Clean your room! Summon bric-à-brac to a public 
trial! [14] The campaign recreated the rhetoric of the civil war and cultural 
revolution. In 1929, the plans were lain for a series of exhibits "On the 
Manifestation of Meshchanstvo in Art" and "On the Anti-Aesthetic Objects 
in Worker's Byt." It could be compared with the Nazi exhibit of 
"Degenerate Art," except that the Soviet exhibit was supposed to be about 
the "degenerate everyday." Actually, the Soviet project never got off the 
ground because the cultural politics changed drastically by the late 1930s. 
The war against the "little gods of things" was a war against fetishization, 
reification, and objectification of life's simple pleasures, but it was also a 
war for the war's sake, a nostalgia for the nomadic life style of a true 
revolutionary. Which is why the furniture had to be simple and portable 
(skladnaia), always ready to be folded and carried along during some 
major political offensive, economic drive or military campaign. Many leftist 
artists who were bent on designing the authentic revolutionary everyday 
were purged during this era. Ironically, the war against "domestic trash" 
outlived its idealistic proponents. 
By the mid-30s, the trashing of domestic life and the critique of 
philistinism temporarily subsided, after expunging some of the left 
intellectuals who attempted to transfer revolutionary art into the practice 
of everyday life. The new acquisitiveness of Soviet citizens was cautiously 
encouraged in official writings, partially in order to justify and partially to 
disguise the legitimation of new order of social inequality, with special 
privileges allocated for the Stalinist elite (who usually resided in spacious 
private apartments). [15] Yet, there was tension in the official acceptance 
of domesticity, and the depiction of its ideal iconography is unstable. In 
the period of High Stalinism, especially after the war, came the attempt to 
create a different iconography of the everyday, in not an avant-guarde but 
imperial socialist realistic style, with the privileged few; yet, some 
iconographic elements -- including the rubber tree plants, those peculiar 
Soviet flowers of evil -- survived. The purging of the rubber plant, from 
20s avant-guarde to 50s Socialist Realism, reveals some paradoxical 
continuities of the utopian vision, although the styles of those two utopias 
were quite different. It also points to some tragic paradoxes in the 
Socialist realist culture which, in a rather cruel manner, realized the old 
dream of the Russian intelligentsia -- the dream of creating a unified 
"people's culture" by abolishing the distinction between "high" and "law." 
During the 30s, intrusion into the everyday became more than rhetorical -
- the home search (obysk) grew to a haunting image of the new Stalinist 
perestroika of everyday life. The brightly lit room of "Moving To The New 
Apartment" is so paranoidly codified because behind the threshold there is 
another scene, that of "removing someone form an old apartment" -- the 
scene of the arrest and home search. 
The 1950s saw a brief domestic revival, a new infatuation with pink-
shaded lamps and escapist sentimental romances about "banana-lemon 
Singapore ," sung by the repentant Russian emigre and born-again 
patriot, Alexander Vertinsky. The intelligentsia of the 60s criticized the 
collaborationist philistinism of Stalinist culture and recreated the spirit of 
nomadic romanticism characteristic of the 20s. It sang about the trips "in 
search of the fog and the smell of taiga," about the romances of alpinists, 
geologists, and flight attendants, and launched its own "campaign against 
domestic trash." This was a peculiar romantic crusade against domestic 
coziness, against not only pink lamp shades and porcelain elephants, but 
also all kinds of comfortable furniture -- soft divans and armchairs, love-
seat sofas, "lyra," and plush curtains -- in the belief that one had no need 
to cultivate little domestic nests. Although the 60s returned in many ways 
to the revolutionary and very mildly avant-guarde discourse of the 20s 
(mildly, because most of the art works and texts remained unavailable), 
yet this return was in many ways revolutionary, particularly in the 
understanding of self and private life. The official "collective" was 
rewritten as an unofficial association of friends, a rather casual community 
of transient soul-mates. Occasionally, one of the soul mates would report 
on another one, occasionally the other one would be called to KGB, but as 
the Soviet anecdote has it, a great progress was made in Brezhnev's 
times -- the 10-year prison-sentence joke became only a three-year one. 
In some ways, this imaginary community of the 60s friends ironically 
flaunted its own fragility. By the late 1960s, "privacy" began to be seen as 
the only honorable and uncompromising response to the system of public 
compromise. Not an escape, but rather as a way of carving an alternative 
space, and a way of personalizing and deideologizing (to use the favorite 
term of perestroika intellectuals) the official maps of everyday life. 
In the 70s, after the Soviet tanks trundled into Prague , a different kind of 
"nomadism" emerged, the members of intelligentsia went into a private 
retreat and questioned the imaginary "kitchen communities" of the 60s. 
Some became dissidents and experienced violent invasion of privacy, 
including KGB home searches, while others conformed to a life of 
stagnation, and a few emigrated abroad -- into capitalist lands where 
"privacy" is protected by law and elevated to the status of a state religion. 
From there, they observed the collapse of Soviet civilization. 
From the ideal image of Soviet collective bliss, marred only by one 
ideologically incorrect plant, we will move to its less ideal representation 
in the communal apartment of the former Leningrad . My "thick 
description" of the communal apartment and the Soviet home -- to borrow 
the term from cultural anthropology -- combines its utopian designs and 
revolutionary genealogy with the examination of actual everyday practices 
that reflect the tragicomedies of Soviet communal living. My reportage 
combines images of utopian house-communes envisioned by the 
revolutionary architects with the few glimpses into the tragical comedy of 
actual communal living. The story of Soviet domestic life and communal 
apartment estranges some of the familiar conceptions of domesticity, 
privacy, and commodity. From Gogol to Chekhov, domesticity in the 
Russian tradition was connected not only with "family values" but also 
with poshlost,' and with a routine both endearing and stifling. Communal 
apartment is at once a result of the revolutionary war on commodity-
fetishism, domestic kitsch and poshlost', a fortress of commodities and 
kitsch in its own right. My description will be shaped by inevitable personal 
memories that will hopefully provide a necessary balance between 
familiarity and defamiliarization, between homesickness and the sickness 
produced by being home. 
The Archeology of the Communal Apartment 
Here is another version of the Soviet family romance. Instead of a portrait 
of Stalin, there is a televisual image of Brezhnev, who is not listened to, 
but merely present as a background noise. My parents were having 
foreign guests for the first time in their life in our room in the communal 
apartment. Our neighbors, "Aunt Vera" and "uncle Fedya," were home. 
Russian children call their adult neighbors "aunts" and "uncles" 
euphemistically, as if they were members of one very extended family. 
Uncle Fedya usually came home drunk and, when Aunt Vera would refuse 
to let him in, he crashed right in the middle of the long corridor -- the 
central "thoroughfare" of the communal apartment, obstructing the 
entrance to our room. As a child, I would often play with the peacefully 
reclining and heavily intoxicated uncle Fedya, with his fingers and his 
buttons, telling him tales to which he probably did not have much to add. 
This time we were all in the room, listening to music to muffle the 
communal noises, and my mother was telling our foreign guests about the 
beauties of Leningrad. "You absolutely must go to the Hermitage, and 
then to Pushkin's apartment-museum and, of course, to the Russian 
Museum . . . ." As the conversation rolled along, and the foreign guest 
was commenting on the riches of the Russian Museum, a narrow yellow 
stream slowly made its way through the door of the room. Smelly, 
embarrassing, intrusive, it formed a little puddle right in front of our 
dinner table. This scene, with the precarious coziness of a family 
gathering, both intimate and public, and a mixture of ease and fear in the 
presence of foreigners and neighbors, remained in mind as a memory of 
home. The family picture is framed by the inescapable stream of Uncle 
Fedya's urine effortlessly crossing minimal boundaries of our communal 
privacy, disrupting the fragile etiquette of communal propriety. (And it 
smelled too much to be domesticated or turned into a metaphor). 
If there was such a thing as a Soviet cultural unconscious, it must have 
been structured as a communal apartment with its flimsy partitions 
between public and private, sober-mindedness and intoxication. The 
Soviet "family romance," to use Freud's phrase, now in its melancholic 
twilight stage, is punctuated by the fluttering sound of a curious 
neighbor's slippers or by an inquisitive representative of the local Housing 
Committee. It is a romance with the collective that is equally unfaithful to 
the communitarian mythologies and to traditional family values. 
In 1926, Walter Benjamin wrote a provocative and laconic sentence in his 
essay about Moscow: "The Bolsheviks have abolished private life." Private 
life in Soviet Russia, Benjamin felt, was to be eliminated along with 
private property. Anything private was denigrated as politically dangerous, 
literally de-prived of social utility and significance. Benjamin astutely 
noticed that just as private life was collectivized, public cafés tended to 
disappear as well. Somehow, the two were linked together. A public 
sphere embodied in the café culture shriveled away along with the excised 
private life, with critical intellectuals becoming an endangered species on 
their way to extinction. 
"Privacy" is a notoriously recalcitrant word when it comes to finding for it 
a Russian analogue. Does it mean that "private life" was lacking in Russia 
, that it was completely abolished by the Bolsheviks, as Walter Benjamin 
claimed, or perhaps that it was never properly acknowledged and 
conceptually appropriated by the Russian intelligentsia? All examples 
given in the famous Dal's Dictionary of the Russian Language under the 
entry "private life" seem tendentious and negatively colored. [16] From 
Fonvizin and Herzen to Dostoyevsky and Berdiaev, Russian thinkers 
ridiculed the Western middle class ideal of "a chicken in every pot and a 
little house of your own." The Russian soul was supposed to be homeless 
and impervious to the middle-class appeal of private life. The latter 
seemed alien to the Russian mores by definition, or perhaps it is the lack 
of definition that made it appear non-Russian. Russian writers declared 
private life as practiced in the West to be "inauthentic" and unspiritual. By 
the same token, Western travellers to Russia , from the Marquis de 
Custine to Benjamin, lamented its inhabitants' flagrant disregard for 
private space. (Custine observes that the bed is among the least used 
items of Russian furniture, acquired mostly for public display. [17] ) 
The Russian kommunalka, a term of endearment and deprication for 
communal apartment, owes its being not just to a housing crisis; it 
derives its roots from a political aesthetic program, a revolutionary 
experiment in collective living.Since very few house-communes were 
actually built, the authorities resorted to a cheaper option: reconstructing 
and partitioning already existing "bourgeois quarters." This was the first 
compromise with the utopian idea of house-commune and the first tacit 
acknowledgement that the drive for the new byt might not be fully 
successful. Perhaps only utopian ideas could have been fully inhabited. 
As so many other things in Soviet Russia, kommunalka sprang from 
Lenin's head. A few weeks after the October Revolution, Lenin drafted a 
plan of expropriation of "big apartments." Any apartment was considered 
big if the number of rooms in it equaled or exceeded the number of its 
regular residents. [18] (A Russian poet, Joseph Brodsky, once called his 
family's living quarters "a room and a half"). Lenin's decree reflected a 
different perspective on home and space than the one found in the West. 
A person, or rather an impersonal statistical unit was entitled not to a 
room or a private space but to certain square footage. The space is 
divided mathematically and bureaucratically, as if it were not a "living" 
space, a concrete home once inhabited by real people, but some 
topological abstraction. As a result, countless apartments in major cities 
that were partitioned in the most bizarre manner, creating unlivable 
spaces, long winding corridors, black entrances, and labyrinthine interior 
yards. 
In the literature and art of the 20s, the search for the dwelling-place lost 
appears to be an all-embracing passion, and identity crisis is closely linked 
to the housing crisis. In the literature and film of the 20s, 
'defamiliarization" is not simply a metaphor for a literary device, but also a 
central thematic preoccupation -- a frustrated attempt to create a new 
Soviet family in the context of the housing shortage. Love, hatred, and 
even melancholia are all secondary passions -- it is usually love of 
"dwelling space" (zhilploshchad), hatred for those who have it, and 
melancholia for the housing lost. The quest for housing space and 
furniture appears to be the major driving force of plot in the 20s literature 
and film. 
Structurally, many literary works and films of the 20s are organized 
around a very desirable object of furniture. Thus the celebrated film 'Bed 
and Sofa" (Tretia meshchanskaia, 1928) portrays a peculiar love triangle -
- between a young woman, her husband (the representative of the new 
Moscow proletariat), and his friend, a printer with whom he fought in the 
Civil war. The friend moves in with the couple because he simply has no 
other place to live. The bed and the sofa in the film are like musical chairs 
-- the husband and the friend change their positions and move from 
spousal bed to marginal sofa as the plot of the film unfolds. It is 
appropriate that in both the English and Russian titles of the film are not 
the names of the heros but the symbolic names of the street they live on 
or the prominent objects of their household. At the end, the heroine 
abandons the uncomfortable communal arrangement leaving the two men 
in their rather unusual male bonding over a cup of tea with jam. The 
satirical tales of the late 20s and early 30s contain abundant tragicomic 
images of neighbors persuading each other to commit suicide for their 
sake, of publicly shamed intellectuals composing iambic tetramentmeters 
in the communal closet while their neighbors are busy expropriating the 
rooms of absent explorers of the North Pole, or subletting six single beds 
in one communal apartment. [19] In Mikhail Bulgakov's novel, Master and 
Margarita, the communal apartment turns into the most fantastic place on 
earth -- more fantastic than the palace of Ponty Pilat . The Satan's ball 
takes place in the "fifth dimension" of the Moscow communal apartment. 
The devil himself is amazed at the tricks of Moscow "apartment exchange" 
and the expansion and divisibility of the dwelling space in the post-
revolutionary capital. 
Since the late 20s and especially during Stalin's times, the communal 
apartment has become a major Soviet institution of social control and a 
form of constant surveillance. The laws of strict "resident permits" 
(propiska) and the campaign against those who were deprived of the 
rights of citizenship (lishentsy) were all connected to the consolidation of 
communal apartment. The communal apartments were under observation 
of the local Housing Committee and were a training ground for grass root 
informants in Stalin's times. By the mid-30s, "separate apartments" came 
into being that became a sign of a special privilege, or occasionally, a 
special luck. [20] Only in the late 50s, new revolution in Soviet daily life 
began with the resettlement of the communal apartments in the "micro-
districts" in the urban outskirts, where many for the first time in their life 
were able to have a state-owned separate apartment. These newly built 
houses were given the unflattering name Khrushchoby, a cross between 
Khrushchev and trushcheby or slums. Until 1990, about 40% of the 
population in the urban centers like Leningrad lived in communal 
apartments. As a form of living, the communal apartment combined 
futuristic designs and premodern ways of living, reminiscent of 
leprosiums, hospitals, camps, and other earlier forms of imposed 
communality. In a sense, communal apartment is Soviet society in 
miniature, a leap of faith from utopian theory to everyday reality, as well 
as a sadly deconstructive allegory of what happened to revolutionary 
constructivism. 
Soviet kommunalka shared with house-commune (dom kommunna) more 
than a linguistic root. It was engendered by the same revolutionary 
topography as the house-commune and propelled by the same utopian 
longing for unfettered collectivity. Architecturally, both were alike in two 
crucial respects: communal kitchen (though each family had its own pots 
and pans and a gas burner on the shared stove) and the corridor clearly 
marking (though never fully separating) the public and private spheres. If 
the house-commune was a microcosm of the ideal revolutionary universe, 
the communal apartment was an actual Soviet microcosm. Economic 
hardship was not the sole reason why the purist socialist idyll turned into 
a social farce. The problem is that any utopia, be it social, political or 
architectural, is a u-chronia, forced atemporality, interrupted time-flow, 
life standing still. What architectural utopia does not take into account is 
history; both in the broad sense of social history and in a sense of 
individual history with its multiple narratives of everyday life. 
The Psychopathology of Soviet Everyday Life 
The partition is the communal apartment's central architectural feature. 
Made of plywood and oddly situated, the partition marks the intersection 
between the public and private spheres within a communal dwelling. 
Because of the chronic housing shortage, the old rooms and corridors 
were endlessly partitioned and subdivided, creating angular spaces, 
windowless living quarters, and rooms overlooking half-lit back yards. 
Tenants strained their imagination by inventing all manner of curtains and 
screens to mark minimal privacy. A plywood partition was a far more 
tenuous barrier against the invasion of privacy than a wall, more a sign of 
division than a division itself. Too flimsy to keep secrets from your 
neighbors, the partition served to create an illusion that some intimacy 
was possible after all. 
Privacy in the communal apartment was often equated with secrecy. The 
secret was a way of life, a form of resistance to forced communality. I 
recall how in the kindergarten we used to play a game called "secrets." 
We would go to the far end of the park somewhere near the fence off the 
public paths and perform a ritual burial of secrets in the ground. The 
"secret" could be a fragment of colored glass, an old stamp, a discarded 
candy wrapper, an old badge -- any useless "found object" that exerted a 
peculiar fascination on us. The "secret" -- something to be hidden in order 
to be shared -- served to affirm a bond of friendship, to escape an 
imposed collective sociality, to create an alternative community. The 
game of secrete was opposed to the official game of hide-and-seek where 
there was nothing to conceal and therefore nothing to uncover. The real 
secret in our game was a voluntary community that we built. This secrecy 
celebrated and dramatized play-acting, albeit in a different mold. This was 
not your run-of-the-mill children's game encouraged by the adults, but a 
symbolic bonding that transcended the officious sociality of Soviet 
everyday life. Adults in the communal apartments would play their own 
games of secrets trying to establish unofficial communities, but not 
necessarily individual privacy. 
One of the main features of communal interactions was "performance 
disruption." Sexual disruption or a sudden invasion of the couple's 
intimate life is comically featured in Soviet fiction and films. Soviet 
sexologists consider the lack of privacy, coupled with the deeply 
internalized fear of interruption, to be the major source of sexual 
disfunction and neurosis among Soviet people. Embarrassment is endemic 
to communal life; it is fed by a painful awareness that one has very little 
control over one's life, that one is doomed to act in the other's presence. 
One could not be embarrassed in complete solitude. Embarrassment 
requires an audience; it is an exemplary trope for social theatricality. 
Etymologically, the word embarrassment signifies physical obstruction. It 
was first applied to human relations only in the 18th century. Ever since, 
it has been inexorably present wherever the private and the public 
spheres rub against each other. The incident with uncle Fedya's urinating 
in the communal corridor is embarrassment the Soviet style. 
Embarrassment my mother felt in front of honored guests, along with 
nonchalance she tried to feign to cover up uncle Fedya's "impropriety," 
were familiar to every Soviet citizen. The embarrassment was such a 
commonplace that it became ritualized and internalized in the Soviet 
psyche. It might have even engendered a kind of communal tolerance, an 
attitude of benign neglect the collective adopted in the face of an odd 
scene or awkward circumstances. But it also concealed repressed anger 
which could break into open any moment. 
A locus of Soviet communality, communal apartment can be both 
endearing and stifling. It is hardly the rational communality of self-
selected members imagined by the 19th century social-democrats or by 
the 20th century architects who designed house-communes. The latter 
were based on the assumption that the new collectivity would make 
obsolete the extended and nuclear family. Communal apartments are 
communal by necessity, not by choice. The communal neighbors are 
joined together in a kind of "mutual responsibility" (krugovaia poruka), 
i.e., they share the duties, use each other's property, and partake in 
domestic gossip. This is essentially a pre-modern type of collectivity and 
centralized control that spread in Russian villages since the time of Mongol 
invasion. Yet, the comparison can be made only with the village commune 
stripped of its romantic and patriotic idealization; moreover, the central 
feature of communal apartment is precisely the clash of different classes 
and social groups, of people with different backgrounds unlike the fairly 
homogeneous neighbors of patriarchal village communes). The main 
features of the village life that influenced Russian political folkways 
included the following: "a strong tendency to maintain stability, a kind of 
closed equilibrium, risk avoidance, the considerable freedom of action and 
expression "within the group," [and] the striving for unanimous final 
resolution of potential divisive issues." [21] 
Various survival strategies were adopted by the inhabitants of communal 
apartments which helped mitigate the harsh realities of communal living. 
The very deficiencies of communal living were sometimes turned upside 
down and used to accentuate the inhabitants' individuality. Thus the 
neighbors would often exaggerate their separateness by mounting their 
own individual door bells, vociferously guarding their exclusive access to a 
particular gas burner, or setting up personal electricity gauges. At the 
same time, residents in communal apartments tended to internalize the 
communality as a fact of life and a guarantee of stability. 
The communal apartment was a classical Soviet stage where the chorus of 
conservative public opinion prevailed and where many, though not all, 
impossible conflicts were resolved. For instance, public opinion would 
compel an intellectual residing in an apartment to refrain from reading in 
the communal closet; the drunkard would be assigned a special kitchen 
corner where he could rest while sobering up; kids were expected to 
wheel their bicycles in the communal corridor very quietly, and Aunt 
Shura reported to the local KGB officer only every other political joke, not 
all of them. The communal stage was not only the field of battle but also a 
field of compromise. Alcoholism, which became rampant in Brezhnev's 
times, was tolerated as a fact of life. The social psychologist Alexander 
Etkind sees alcoholism as a metaphor for stagnation (in Russian zapoi, "an 
alcoholic binge," and zastoi, "stagnation," rhyme.) The addict was not 
compelled to sober up, and a consistently sober person was looked at with 
suspicion: nobody should stand out in the collective and be better than 
the next person. In a way, alcoholic intoxication was a state of mind most 
adequate to bizarre Soviet reality. "The best moments in the life of an 
alcoholic are not his sober achievements but the drunken unity with equal 
others." [22] No wonder Gorbachev's reforms began with the anti-
alcoholism campaign. 
Individualism or uncommon behavior were discouraged in communal 
apartments, just as they were in the old village commune, and envy 
permeated relations between residents. "Envy" is the title of one of the 
earliest Soviet novels of Soviet cohabitation that preceded communal 
apartments. While envy is by no means peculiar to Soviet everyday life, it 
is marked here by what Igor Kon, a leading Russian sociologist, calls 
"historical immaturity." It is akin not so much to the competition present 
in developed capitalist societies but to interactions found in pre-industrial 
communities, where relationships are governed by a "zero-sum" 
presupposition: one person's gain is regarded as the other's loss. 
According to Kon, "the dictatorship of envy, disguised as social justice, 
efficiently blocked individual efforts to do better and to rise above the 
average," and it discloses "a general mistrust of the individual 
achievement and the fear of social differentiation. [23] 
Any communal apartment dweller is scared for life by that symbolic 
"mutual responsibility" -- a double blind of love and hatred, envy and 
attachment, secrecy and exhibitionism, embarrassment and compromise; 
people in collective dwellings professed to hate any form of communal 
interaction, yet, they often internalized the communal structures and later 
recalled them with nostalgia. An elderly woman, a Russian emigre now 
living in the United States , suffered all her life in the horrendous 
communal apartments. Now she complains of solitude: "Worse come to 
worst, even after peeing in your teapot, they [my neighbors] would call 
you an ambulance when you needed one, or lent you a little bit of salt for 
your cooking . . . it is this spoonful of roughly grained salt that I miss so 
much." 
Communal apartments have no living rooms, bedrooms or studies -- only 
"rooms," so the traditional "bourgeois division of labor" and the separation 
of domestic spheres are supposed to be banished. The room is an ideally 
transformable stage fit for all occasions. It can be made into a bedroom, a 
guest room, a dining room, a nursery or a salon. The kitchen is not a 
communal meeting place; quite to the contrary, it is a place of forced 
communality that must be avoided. One recently interviewed communal 
apartment resident called it "domestic Nagorno-Karabakh" (a region in the 
former Soviet Union torn by an ethnic strife). The communal kitchen is a 
battleground -- not of ideas, but of petty rivalries. What is at issue here is 
who burns more gas, whose turn it is to cook or clean, and who is to 
blame for the breakdown in communal etiquette. Each family has its 
burner and a designated time to use it. When the cooking is done, the 
family members make sure they carry to their rooms all their pots and 
pans so that nobody else would use those scarce personal belongings. In 
the same way, toilet paper, a rare commodity in the Soviet Union , was 
kept in the room and carried inconspicuously to the toilet. However, for 
those who could not procure toilet paper, there was usually the newspaper 
Pravda stocked in the bathroom to be read or put to another functional 
use. The intellectual in the communal closet -- in the literal rather than 
literary sense -- is a character prominently featured in Soviet literature. 
In the 1960s, an alternative kitchen culture began to appear in Soviet 
society, following Khrushchev's thaw. It was widespread among Soviet 
intellectuals, especially those lucky enough to have an apartment of their 
own. An unofficial kitchen gathering featured frank political talk, good 
company, and some food. The kitchen functioned as an informal salon for 
the intelligentsia in the 60s. The most important issues were discussed in 
the overcrowded kitchen, where people "really talked," shared news, 
flirted and occasionally munched on whatever the family's refrigerator 
would have to offer. The kitchen salon of the 60s was a perfect site where 
grown-up children could continue to bury their secrets and celebrate 
shared escapes from the predictability of Soviet life. 
Soviet Interiors: Aunt Liuba's Still Life 
Benjamin wrote, "To live is to leave traces." [24] Perhaps this is the best 
definition of the private -- to leave traces for oneself and for others, 
memory traces of which one cannot be deprived. A room in the Soviet and 
post-Soviet communal apartment reveals an obsession with leaving 
traces, with commemoration and preservation in the most ostensible 
fashion. The campaign against "domestic trash" failed miserably in most 
communal apartments. Indeed, we can discern signs of rebellion in the 
conspicuous accumulation of "domestic trash." The so-called "domestic 
trash" (the expression derives from a well known Mayakovsky's play) 
survived all ideological purges and changes in leadership. A secret residue 
of privacy, it defended people from externally imposed and internalized 
communality. 
Let us enter the room of a sixty-year old widow, "Aunt Liuba," whom I 
visited in the Summer of 1991 and 1992. Liuba N. came to Leningrad from 
Belorus after World War II. She was assigned a room in a communal 
apartment and found a job as an accountant in the medical student's 
dorm. Aunt Liuba belonged to a lower urban strata which never 
completely freed itself from meshchanski impulses. Aunt Liuba's room 
contained nearly everything that was considered to be in bad taste from 
the 20s to 70s, including the infamous rubber tree plant. She did not 
move to a newly renovated apartment as in the exemplary Stalinist 
painting, but continued to live in the old communal flat for about thirty 
years, from the late 50s to the 90s. Her room appears untouched by both 
the 60s campaigns for good taste and more recent trends in fashion. 
Although the city and the country where aunt Liuba lives have recently 
changed their name, her room preserved a certain domestic mentality 
that has survived historical upheavals. 
This is how the room looked the first Summer after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union . In Aunt Liuba's only room of some 13 square meters, there 
is a cupboard -- a kind of a commode made in the early sixties, a bed, a 
table, and an old-fashioned TV set. The television stands in the center of 
the table on a Russian shawl that serves as a table cloth and is treated 
like an altar of modern conveniences. The TV set is covered with a special 
lacy cloth that used to cover icons and, later, gramophones, all of which 
were treated with a peculiar reverence. Aunt Liuba's room reminds us of 
many traditional Slavic dwellings, except that the functions of a stove and 
a red corner (where icons were displayed) are now taken up by the TV 
and the display shelf of the commode where all the most precious items 
are stored for everyone to see. The blinking artificial light of the TV is 
reflected in the commode's glass doors, casting bluish shadows upon 
personal possessions. 
The commode-cupboard is the most important piece of furniture in the 
old-fashioned communal apartment room. It has survived the campaign 
against domestic trash, the civil war on meshchanstvo, and ironic 
debunking by high brow writers. (At the end of Erdman's play The Suicide, 
the main character, would-be suicide Semion, begs his neighbors and 
friends to spare him and not to force him to kill himself. He is ready to 
sign off everything to them, to refuse food, enslave his wife, send his 
mother in law to work in the mines, and . . . to sell his commode). The 
genesis of the commode symbolizes the development of both bourgeois 
commodity and of the conceptions of comfort, home, and interiority.Ifthe 
mid-19th century is an historical moment when, in Benjamin's words, "the 
private individual enters the stage of history, [25] then the mid 1920s is a 
turning point when that private individual goes backstage in Russia . And 
yet, the old and rather modest commode found in Soviet communal 
apartments reminds us that personal pride and the desire for individuation 
have not died. 
Aunt Liuba has carefully arranged the objects on her commode. There is a 
big plastic apple, brought from her native Byelorussian village, a Chinese 
thermos, with bright floral ornaments, a naturalistic porcelain dog, three 
bottles containing different glass flowers (daisies and more exotic red 
flowers with a touch of elegance), a samovar, a set of folk-style Soviet 
porcelain cups. "You see I have it all here, it's my still life," she tells me 
proudly as I photograph her room. Curiously, she uses an artistic term 
"still life" to describe this corner of her quarters. In fact, she says "nature 
morte" -- a Russian gallicism that might have reflected her high school 
tours of painting galleries obligatory for Soviet students. The display is 
clearly tinged with an aesthetic quality in her mind, as well as with 
personal memories. Indeed, there is something pleasing and cheerful in 
the brightness and unabashed eclecticism of her collection, which 
contrasts sharply with the bleak uniformity of the communal corridors. 
How can we frame conceptually this amateur "still life" in the communal 
apartment? 
In Russia , one can only speak about nostalgia for a still life, nostalgia for 
sustained and sustaining materiality of everyday life that withstands the 
winds of time and never-ending crises. Liuba's collection of Soviet ready-
mades exemplifying her trivial private utopias and everyday minor 
aesthetic, framed by the glass of the commode as if it were a museum 
exhibit, is a monument to that desire for a still life, for a life that does not 
rush anywhere amidst the whirlpool of social metamorphoses. Liuba's "still 
life" has no masterpieces or truly exotic objects: her beloved objects are 
all mass-produced and slightly out-of-fashion, giving to the whole scene 
an aura of time past. The woman has gathered together all her beautiful 
and memorable things. The ornaments clash, re-creating distant images 
of the village home and pre-revolutionary images of cozy merchants' 
dwellings; their covers, napkins, and laces give the feeling of 
"completeness and personal touch" which Benjamin identifies with 
bourgeois interiors. 
Liuba's room is full of flowers: Soviet Victorian roses on the communal 
wallpaper; exotic red glass flowers and simple plastic daisies on the shelf; 
stylized gold and yellow daisies on the porcelain, red floral decorations on 
the wooden "khokhloma" spoon. The only real flower is a little rubber tree 
plant comfortably perched on the window sill (I was glad to find this old 
friend here). Aunt Liuba's carefully gathered exhibit presents a daunting 
challenge to the theoretical framing of domestic objects. 
From the 1920s and through the 1970s, domestic object was a precarious 
possession in the Soviet homes, an endangered species constantly 
threatened by the ideological, social and economic conditions of the time. 
The fact of being denied objects is not only a social deprivation but also a 
sensory deprivation, a thwarting of sentience, human contact, the powers 
of projection and reciprocity. The war on fetishism carries a different 
meaning in a country where most people have experienced the loss of 
domesticity at least once in a life time and where the preservation of 
domestic objects spelled not so much consumerism as survival. 
The artifact on communal display is an object preserving private memory, 
a souvenir to privacy itself, a remnant of a pre-industrial and possibly pre-
revolutionary world. The souvenir displaces the object from common into 
individual history. The souvenir's owner becomes the author who 
reinvents the objects and their uses and refuses to accept the official 
"system of objects," whether that system is the one of capitalist 
commercialism or of frugal collective ideology. 
The personal domestic objects of aunt Liuba are difficult to theorize. They 
are too useless for both use-value and exchange value theories, neither 
authentically primitive nor exotic enough for transgressive modern 
usages, too trivial and banal in a non-fatal manner to be turned into a 
simulacrum à la Baudrillard. In other words, they are impure and 
outmoded on all grounds. The analysis of aunt Liuba's still life is about the 
everyday resistance to sociological theories, yet her objects can tell us a 
lot about eclectic Soviet cultural mythologies. They are not about de-
familiarization but rather about domestication of estranged ideological 
designs. Liuba's objects are not bare essentials, neither are they objects 
of status or conspicuous consumption. If they do represent a need, it is 
first and foremost an aesthetic need, a desire for beauty with minimal 
available means, or an aesthetic domestication of the hostile outside 
world. 
In the rooms inhabited by ex-Soviet intellectuals, by contrast, we do not 
find cheap old-fashioned chests of drawers. What we encounter here are 
the 1960s style wall units and shelves designed in a modern functional 
fashion and made in so-called "developed Socialist countries" like Hungary 
or even Yugoslavia. On the surface, such objects de-emphasize the 
fetishistic quality of the furniture and eliminate the excessive curves and 
ornamental details of the commodes. However, the wall units and ample 
book shelve space popular among the intelligentsia were also status 
symbols, fetishes of rediscovered modernist functionality. Hard-to-get 
books and collected works of foreign authors signaled one's membership 
in the esteemed status group of intelligentsia (note that the prestige 
bestowed on the intelligentsia is itself a trace of the pre-revolutionary 
civilization where intellectuals were held in high esteem). Given the 
material scarcity in the post-World War II era, personal possessions were 
hardly acquired exclusively for "conspicuous consumption." The space 
between the folding glass on the bookshelf, an ephemeral space, where 
the owners would typically display especially meaningful personal objects 
like photographs, images from travel, baby pictures, portraits of 
Hemingway, or of popular Soviet bard Vladimir Vysotsky (both with beards 
and with or without cigars), snapshots of far-away friends, occasional toys 
or souvenirs from Crimea or Susdal, envelops with foreign stamps, loose 
pages from disjointed old books, dated newspaper clippings, and so forth. 
This narrow two-dimensional space behind the glass covering the book 
shelf is a coded image of the room's owner, the person's carefully 
arranged interface with the world. The narrative of the treasured objects 
cannot be easily reconstructed by the outsider, for it is non-linear, 
unreadable, with many blank spots, oddly meaningful banalities and mild 
obsessions. It is not a biographical fiction but a fragmented history of 
one's fragmented life, a story of spiritual odyssey fashioned by 
circumstances, a record of what really matters, assorted traces of lived or 
vicariously experienced life that have survived the drudgery of dailyness. 
Sometimes, it is a travelogue that regales us with real or imaginary 
journeys to exotic places and daring escapes into wishful thinking. In the 
60s and early 70s, when traveling abroad was nearly impossible, the 
Soviets engaged in "virtual travel" by watching an immensely popular TV 
program "The Club of Cine-Travelers," a Soviet version of National 
Geographic that offered everyone a free transit to the West and beyond. 
There appears to be an unwritten law of fashion which tells everyone 
when Hemingway and Pasternak are out and Vysotsky and Solzhenitsyn 
are in. With the passage of time, Solzhenitsyn also becomes passe, 
supplanted by the photo-reproduction of the exotic and apolitical 
Nephertiti, the mythical beauty queen of ancient Egypt whom Soviet 
intellectuals inherited from the traveling exhibit, "The Treasures of 
Tutankhamen." Now side by side with Nephertiti is a half-dressed foreign 
pin-up girl with a non-Russian smile that have replaced all past political 
and poetic heroes. Private memorabilia is not deprived of cultural myths; 
it is separated from the dominant discourses only by a fragile plywood 
partition. But it is the space where fragments of those myths can be 
reconstructed in a creative personal collage, even if this collage lacks 
aesthetic unity. The objects/souvenirs are often the only personal 
possessions, offering us erratic narratives of utopian coziness and 
homeliness. Both priceless and cheap, conspicuous and private, they 
make us question some cherished precepts of the commodity theory. 
The Ruins of Soviet Communality 
The communal apartment has always been an exemplary metaphor of 
Soviet communality, official and unofficial. Nowadays, it is a frequent 
subject of editorials in the post-Soviet press. When Stalin was taken out of 
the mausoleum, people joked that Khrushchev had resettled Lenin's 
communal apartment, which (the joke is updated in the post-Soviet era) 
could be now fully "privatized." [26] A writer Alexander Kabakov ridiculed 
Russian ultra-nationalists for their "communal apartment tactics." By 
mobilizing neighborhood bullies (kham), Kabakov argues, ultra-
nationalists hope to force intellectuals into playing by their boorish rules of 
insult and coercion. [27] Memories of the communal apartment, like 
chronic childhood diseases, cannot be cured; communal apartment 
strategies of attack, survival, and resistance shaped the mentality of 
several Soviet generations. 
Once a realm of powerful myths, the communal apartment itself is on its 
way to becoming a myth. From a forward-looking utopia, it has evolved 
into a nostalgic memory of a quasi-paradise lost. Some former communal 
apartment neighbors remember it with a mixture of anger and 
endearment, not merely as "domestic Nagorno-Karabakh," but as a place 
of their old-fashioned Soviet childhood and youth, when life was difficult, 
pleasures simple, and -- for better or for worse -- there did not seem to 
be any exit. A recent article in a popular weekly Ogonek titled 
"Kommunalka" remembered the communal apartment with bitter-sweet 
irony as a never-never land where one could be happy with so little. This 
precarious Soviet happiness is now largely extinct. And to many former 
Soviet citizens deprived of privacy in the past, the old miseries seem less 
frightening than the incoming privatization. 
Although the communal apartment lost its status as an officially 
sanctioned institution at the end of Gorbachev's reign, it has survived as 
an unfortunate fact of life reflecting the continuous housing shortage. The 
radical perestroika brought down many old partitions in the former 
communal apartments. This latest revolution in everyday life had to 
proceed slowly, for it had to grapple with the consequences of the older 
campaigns, such as the drive for new byt that brought forth communal 
apartments, and Khrushchev's reforms which moved about 30 percent of 
Soviet urban dwellers into separate apartments on the cities' outskirts. 
Before the privatization campaign, there were 300,000 communal 
apartments in Moscow . According to the official statistics, forty percent of 
the population in Leningrad , recently renamed into St. Petersburg , still 
lives in communal apartments. The housing conditions are particularly 
harsh in the city center. Privatizing apartments turned out to be an 
excruciating task, straining the emerging post-Soviet legal culture which 
has stumbled against the unpredictable (or rather very predictable but 
never legally accounted for) webs of Soviet everyday practices. In 1988, 
the Council of Ministers approved an amendment to the existing laws that 
allowed citizens residing in private apartments to buy them from the city 
government. There were very few takers at first. In 1989, only 0.03 
percent of all apartments and 0.07 percent of apartment residents turned 
their apartments into private property. [28] In July of 1991, the Supreme 
Soviet adopted a new law that was designed to speed up the apartment 
privatization process. The rooms in the communal apartment still could 
not be privatized. 
The privatization policy encountered a lot of popular criticism reflecting 
not only Soviet prejudices but also the traditional Russian suspicion of 
private property. A friend of mine reports a conversation on the trolley 
overheard in 1991: "They are going to get privatization vouchers; we are 
going to privatize!" To which another person replies, "Aren't you ashamed 
to use such words in the presence of women." "Privatization" remains a 
bad word for many ex-Soviet citizens. An aging school teacher wrote a 
letter to Ogonek, complaining that she was ostracized by other dwellers 
residing in the same housing project when she decided to privatize her 
one-room standard apartment. She was called "NEP woman, capitalist, 
and private property owner" -- the words sound derogatory if not obscene 
in Russian and come directly from the vocabulary of the political insults 
that carried a mortal danger in the Stalinist epoch: sobstvennitsa, 
from sobstvennost, "property owner" or chastnitsa, 
from chastnyi (private, particular). 
By 1990, only a few completely dilapidated and sub-standard even by 
Soviet standards communal apartments had been taken over by artists 
and, later on, almost like in downtown Manhattan, reclaimed by the newly 
emerging shady businessmen, real estate operators, and some 
"astrologists anonymous." After the 1991 law on domestic property 
privatization came into effect, a new wave of housing "gentrification" (to 
use the American term) began in Russia , which left in its wake the clearly 
visible trail of bribery and coercion. 
Imagine a post-Soviet nouveau riche, a young woman who works as a 
financial director for the international "joint venture" and falls in love with 
a dilapidated but spacious Moscow communal apartment featuring bay 
windows and a neo-classical facade. She would have to pay to each 
communal apartment resident a hefty fee and supply each of them with a 
separate apartment where they would be willing to move. Moreover, she 
would have to find her way around (usually by bribing) the obsolete yet 
fully functional Soviet bureaucrats from the Housing Committee. Also, 
there is still in place an old Soviet mechanism of social control -- resident 
permit or propiska, without which a person is not allowed to settle in a 
given city. "A birthmark of the past," this resident permit is a bureaucrat's 
dream opportunity to extol bribery. In one of the many stories I have 
heard on this subject, an apparatchik from the Housing Committee 
demanded a bribe of no less than $20,000 (probably more than a year's 
income of all the building's residents) for the permit to privatize a 
particularly attractive apartment on Arbat Street . When the would-be 
owner refused to pay the bribe, the bureaucrat resorted to threatening 
phone calls demanding that his terms were met. The harassment ceased 
only when the aspiring owner solicited help from the wife of a prominent 
Russian politician. [29] 
These stories point out that the old Soviet ways are far from dead. The old 
techniques of coping with the Soviet bureaucracy come handy when ex-
Soviet citizens have to battle for their newly acquired rights. The dream of 
a western-style private dwelling is still just a dream for most Russians 
who have survived socialism. By the same token, many post-Soviet 
reforms are but legal abstractions and nobody know how to put them into 
practice. "Free market" and "democracy" remain empty foreign words in 
the minds of the Russian people, as "socialist political economy" and 
"communism" used to be. 
In these post-Soviet, post-communist, post-modern times, all the words 
formerly deemed untranslatable into Russian are finding their way into 
post-Soviet discourse: mentalnost, identichnost, manadzher, sponsor. The 
once ubiquitous adjectives like "collective'" and "communal" are out of 
fashion. Everything that starts with the foreign prefix "inter" (like 
"international") is in. International companies, joint ventures, 
cooperatives are in vogue. And so is privatization in all its numberless 
forms. Where in the Soviet past private life used to be forbidden in public, 
now there is a newspaper called 
Private Life ( Chastnaia Zhizn) specializing in personal ads, cries of 
loneliness, and searches for "Western" husbands and wives. One female 
reader wrote a funny teasing line, in response to the newspaper's verse 
contest, that reflects all the ambiguities and paradoxes of the new and still 
untranslatable (or at least unprecedented in any Western language) post-
Soviet byt: "So, what is to be done? Oh, well, I won't despair. I don't have 
personal life but 'Private Life' I do." Here "private life" is placed in 
quotation marks; it is only a name of a newspaper, a new cliche of the 
post-Soviet language and a fitting name for a newspaper ready to tap a 
Soviet language, not yet a "property" of still deprived Russian citizens. 
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